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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-2167 
 ___________ 
 
 ALEX DORMEVIL, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A079-494-360) 
 Immigration Judge: Alberto Riefkohl 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 6, 2011 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: April 7, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Alex Dormevil, a citizen of Haiti, seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA) decision that upheld an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of Dormevil’s motion to 
reconsider the IJ’s earlier denial of a motion to reopen removal proceedings.  For the 
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reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
I. 
Dormevil fled from Haiti to Canada on October 8, 1999.  That same day, 
Dormevil was issued a B-1 nonimmigrant visitor visa from the United States Embassy in 
Montreal, and he entered the United States following inspection in New York.  Dormevil 
overstayed the time permitted by the B-1 visa.  In October 2003, he married a naturalized 
United States citizen.  In September 2004, Dormevil was issued a notice to appear.  He 
was charged with being removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (“An alien present 
in the United States without being admitted or paroled . . . is inadmissible.”).  To block 
his removal, Dormevil applied for asylum, claiming a fear of persecution both by 
government officials and by Fanmi Lavalas—the political party of former Haitian 
president Jean-Bertrand Aristide—on account of Dormevil’s political activities when he 
lived in Haiti.1
On the advice of his former counsel, Pierre Eloi, Dormevil withdrew his asylum 
application and accepted a grant of voluntary departure from IJ Daniel Meisner on July 
26, 2005.  Eloi advised Dormevil that if his United States citizen spouse were to file a 
Form I-130 Petition for Alien Relative sometime in the future, then Dormevil could 
reopen removal proceedings in order to adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent 
resident.  Apparently, and although IJ Meisner had done so in writing, Eloi did not inform 
 
                                                 
 1  The substance of the asylum application was inconsistent with a U.S.-arrival 
date of October 8, 1999.  
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Dormevil that his failure to comply with the voluntary departure order would render 
Dormevil ineligible for adjustment of status—and many other forms of immigration 
relief—for a period of ten years, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)(B).  Eloi did, 
however, advise Dormevil by letter dated July 27, 2005, that “only exceptional 
circumstances will except you from leaving as promised.”  (AR 14.)2
The BIA dismissed Dormevil’s appeal.  The BIA agreed with IJ Riefkohl that 
§ 1229c(d)(1)(B) renders Dormevil ineligible for adjustment of status for a period of ten 
   
At some point, Dormevil’s wife filed an I-130 petition, and it was approved by 
USCIS in February 2008.  Based on the approved I-130 petition, Dormevil moved to 
reopen removal proceedings in order to adjust his status.  IJ Alberto Riefkohl denied the 
motion on the ground that Dormevil could not show eligibility for adjustment of status, 
solely due to his failure to produce evidence of proper entry into the United States.  
Dormevil filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted evidence of his lawful entry 
from Canada.  IJ Riefkohl denied the motion for reconsideration, invoking 
§ 1229c(d)(1)(B) as an alternative basis for refusing to reopen removal proceedings.  
Dormevil, with new counsel, appealed to the BIA, claiming for the first time that Eloi 
provided ineffective assistance in failing to advise Dormevil about the penalties for 
failure to voluntary depart. 
                                                 
 2  Eloi was incorrect.  The “exceptional circumstances” exception had been 
eliminated almost a decade earlier by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-546.  In re Zmijewska, 24 I. & N. Dec. 87, 90 
(2007). 
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years, a fact justifying the denial of Dormevil’s motion for reconsideration.  The BIA 
thus found that the approved I-130 petition was “of little consequence.”  (AR 4.)  In 
addition, the BIA determined that it “lack[ed] the authority to apply an ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ or other general equitable exception to the penalty provisions for failure 
to depart.”  (AR 4.)  The BIA also determined that, to the extent Dormevil claimed that 
his failure to depart was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, Dormevil had 
failed to comply with the procedural requirements of In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 
(1988).  Finally, the BIA noted that, its decision notwithstanding, “a statement released 
by the Department of Homeland Security on January 13, 2010, reflects that ‘all removals 
to Haiti [have been halted] for the time being in response to the devastation caused by 
[the] earthquake.’”  (AR 5.)  This petition for review followed. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  Kucana v. Holder, --- U.S. ---, 130 S. 
Ct. 827, 840 (2010).  We generally review only the decision of the BIA, but we can look 
to the IJ’s findings of fact or rulings on particular claims insofar as the BIA expressly 
deferred to them.  See Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 2010).  The denial 
of a motion for reconsideration under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b), like the denial of a motion to 
reopen 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  See INS v. Doherty, 
502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992); Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005).  Under 
this standard, we may reverse the BIA’s decision only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or 
contrary to law.”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2003).  
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III. 
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in affirming IJ Riefkohl’s denial of 
Dormevil’s motion for reconsideration.  Such motions essentially request that the agency 
reexamine a particular decision “in light of additional legal arguments, a change of law, 
or perhaps an argument or aspect of the case which was overlooked.”  In re Ramos, 23 I. 
& N. Dec. 336, 338 (BIA 2002) (en banc) (citations and internal quotations omitted).  In 
this case, Dormevil’s motion to reopen removal proceedings in order to adjust status was 
legally frivolous, given the dictates of § 1229c(d)(1)(B).  Accordingly, reexamination of 
IJ Riefkohl’s first decision (denying reopening) would have been futile, and the BIA’s 
affirmance of IJ Riefkohl’s second decision (denying reconsideration) was proper.   
As we stated earlier in this opinion, on July 26, 2005, IJ Meisner ordered 
Dormevil to voluntarily depart the United States prior to November 22, 2005.  (AR 82.)3
                                                 
 3  IJ Meisner’s order noted that Dormevil was declining to adjust his status at that 
time in light of his “fraudulent” I-589 form.  (AR 82.)   
 
  
Despite written notice that his “remaining in the United States beyond the authorized date 
[would] result in . . . being found ineligible for certain forms of relief under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act,” including “[a]djustment of status or change of status 
as provided for in [INA] Section[s] 245, 248 or 249” (AR 84), Dormevil did not leave the 
United States.  Dormevil claims that his failure to depart was not ‘voluntary,’ given 
Eloi’s bad advice.  We agree with the BIA, however, that Dormevil’s claim must fail at 
the outset because his motions before the IJ did not substantially comply with the 
 
6 
procedural requirements for raising an ineffective assistance claim under Lozada.  See 
Rranci v. Att’y Gen., 540 F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 2008) (outlining those requirements); Lu 
v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 129 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that “the Lozada requirements are 
a reasonable exercise of the Board’s discretion.”).4
Accordingly, Dormevil’s  petition for review will be denied.
  Relatedly, we reject Dormevil’s 
claim that the BIA abused its discretion in declining to remand proceedings to the IJ for 
consideration of a procedurally deficient ineffective assistance claim.     
                                                 
 4  In discussing permissible exceptions to § 1229c(d)(1)(B), the BIA referenced its 
precedent holding that an alien’s failure to depart is not “voluntary” where the alien, 
“through no fault of his or her own, is unaware of the voluntary departure order or is 
physically unable to depart.”  In re Zmijewska, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 94.  The BIA’s opinion 
in In re Zmijewska stressed that this “involuntariness” exception to § 1229c(d)(1)(B), 
was not a “substitute for the repealed ‘exceptional circumstances’ exception,” id.; in fact, 
the scope of the exception was much narrower than that of its predecessor.  Dormevil 
does not address—and this is not the proper case to confront the question of—whether 
the BIA’s interpretation of the phrase “fails voluntarily to depart the United States,” 
found in § 1229c(d)(1)(B), should be accorded deference under Chevron v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  We thus leave that inquiry for another day. 
